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THE TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF MOVABLES
In 1979, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the first installment in
an overall revision of the Civil Code articles on property. That first
enactment concerned the articles on ownership. In 1980, a key article
of that segment of the revision, article 520, was repealed. In 1982, the
Code articles pertaining to possession and prescription were revised. The
purpose of this comment is to determine what effect these changes have
had in one particular area of law-the transfer of ownership of movables.
Nature of the Problem
The rules of law governing the transfer of ownership of movables
arise out of a conflict between two competing interests: the security of
ownership and the security of transaction.' This conflict is created by
two opposing legal principles. The first is the rule codified in article
2279 of the French Civil Code which states that "la possession vaut
titre" (with respect to movables possession is considered equivalent to
title).2 This rule promotes the security of transaction by protecting those
who acquire possession of a movable in good faith from one they believe
had the ability to transfer its ownership. The opposing principle is the
common law rule "nemo dat quod non habet" (no one can transfer a
greater right than he himself has). Louisiana Civil Code article 2452
expresses this principle by providing that the sale of a thing belonging
to another is null.' This rule affords protection to the security of
ownership by recognizing the rights of the dispossessed owner in the
movable.
Copyright 1987, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. Franklin, Security of Acquisition and of Transaction: La Possession Vaut Titre
and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 589, 590-91 (1932). The security of acquisition
(hereinafter referred to as the security of ownership) protects the original owner who has
not voluntarily parted with ownership. The security of transaction protects the commercial
transaction through which an innocent third party acquires the thing.
2. French Civil Code (C. Civ. art.) art. 2279 provides:
With reference to movables, possession is considered equivalent to a title. But
a person who has lost or who has been robbed of something can bring an
action to recover it against any person he finds in possession thereof 'within
three years of the date of the loss or robbery and the latter has his right of
action over against the person from whom he received it.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 2452 provides: "The sale of a thing belonging to another
person is null; it may give rise to damages, when the buyer knew not that the thing
belonged to another person."
See also 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 94, at 163, 165, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
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The conflict between these two legal principles arises in situations
whereby, for one of several reasons, be it loss, theft, a vice of consent
or misplaced confidence, 4 the owner of a movable, X, is dispossessed
of it by a second person, Y, who purports to transfer its ownership to
a third person, Z. Both X and Z claim ownership of the movable and
seek protection from Y's misconduct. X seeks security of ownership; Z
seeks security of transaction.
Louisiana Law Prior to the Revision
Legislation
Prior to the revision of the Civil Code in 1979, Louisiana law did
not contain a strong statement of the principle "la possession vaut
titre." Article 22791 of the French Civil Code was not incorporated into
the Louisiana Civil Code.6 On the other hand, article 2452 clearly stated
the opposing principle of "nemo dat quod non habet." 7
Other strong legislative indications favoring the security of ownership
prior to the revision were the articles on acquisitive prescription of
movables.8 Article 3506 provided that a possessor of a movable for
three years in good faith and by just title would acquire ownership by
prescription, unless the thing had been stolen or lost.9 This article thus
protected the dispossessed owner of a thing for three years. If the thing
were lost or stolen, article 3509 would apply, which provided for ten-
year acquisitive prescription if the possessor lacked the requirements of
good faith or just title. 10 The Code gave some protection to the good
4. In this context, these terms can be defined as follows. Theft means to be
dispossessed of the thing by another without knowledge or against one's will. A vice of
consent has the meaning found in Louisiana Civil Code article 1948, which provides:
"Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress"; more specifically, fraud in this
context means to transfer possession to another through a misrepresentation. Misplaced
confidence means to transfer possession to someone for safekeeping, who breaches that
trust and transfers the movable to a third person.
5. C. Civ. art. 2279.
6. S. Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 94, at 163 ("[Ilts [the principle of la possession
vaut titre] exclusion seems to have been the result not of inadvertence but of a policy
determination by the Louisiana redactors.").
7. Id. at 164.
8. Franklin, supra note I, at 603-04.
9. La. Civ. Code art. 3506 (1870) provided: "If a person has possessed in good
faith and by a just title, as owner, a movable thing, during three successive years without
interruption, he shall acquire the ownership of it by prescription unless the thing was
stolen or lost."
10. La. Civ. Code art. 3509 (1870) provided: "When the possessor of any movable
whatever has possessed it for ten years without interruption, he shall acquire the ownership
of it without being obliged to produce a title or to prove that he did not act in bad
faith."
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faith possessor in article 3507; if the possessor of a stolen or lost thing
bought it at a public auction or from a person who usually sold such
things, the true owner would be required to reimburse the purchase
price before reclaiming the thing." These articles pointed to the con-
clusion that the legislature intended to protect the security of ownership
of movables, but only for specific periods of time following disposs-
ession. 1 2
Jurisprudence
In the absence of clear legislative direction, the Louisiana courts
sought to balance the conflict between security of ownership and security
of transaction. Recognizing that strict adherence to the principle that
no one can transfer a greater right than he has would impede commerce
and result in harsh consequences for good faith purchasers, the courts
developed certain exceptions to the rule, similar to the common law
bona fide purchaser doctrine.13 The requirements for the application of
these exceptions were that the purchaser have acquired the thing in good
faith, without notice that the seller was not the true owner, and for
valuable consideration.' 4
11. La. Civ. Code art. 3507 (1870) provided: "If, however, the possessor of a thing
stolen or lost bought it at public auction or from a person in the habit of selling such
things, the owner of the thing can not obtain restitution of it, without returning to the
purchaser the price it cost him." The Louisiana Supreme Court held, in Security Sales
Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1928), that articles 3506 and 3507 must be
read together and concluded that the possessor could not demand reimbursement until
after he had possessed the thing for three years. Otherwise, the possessor claiming reim-
bursement under article 3507 would be in a better position than the possessor of a thing
not lost or stolen under article 3506. See generally Comment, Sale of Another's Movables-
History, Comparative Law, and Bona Fide Purchasers, 29 La. L. Rev. 329, 345-46 (1969).
12. Nevertheless, although the Louisiana Civil Code contained no direct authority
protecting the security of transaction, remnants of the principle of the French article 2279
did in fact exist. Franklin, supra note 1, at 601-04. See also S. Litvinoff, supra note 3,
§ 94, at 163-64, and Comment, supra note 11, at 342-43. This suggests that the principle
embodied in article 2452, that the sale of a thing belonging to another is null, was not
to be strictly adhered to.
13. S. Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 94, at 164-66. See also id. § 87, at 147-49 ("[T]he
doctrine known as 'bona fide purchase' . . . was developed upon equitable principles."
It was based on exceptions to the basic rule that the buyer of goods obtained no better
title than his vendor. "Thus, a vendee who obtains a thing by a vice of consent, such
as error, fraud or duress, acquires only a 'voidable title which the vendor may attack in
equity: however, upon a transfer by the vendee to a bona fide purchaser, the voidable
title is made good. The preference over the original seller given to the bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice is based on the theory that the legal right of the third party
cuts off the equity of the original seller." The common 'law bona fide purchaser doctrine
is based on title and not possession.).
14. S. Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 87, at 151. The lack of notice requirement would
include lack of notice that the seller acquired the movable through a contract voidable
for a vice of consent. Id.
1987]
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A study of the jurisprudence reveals two lines of reasoning used by
the courts to avoid application of the rule in article 2452 that the sale
of a thing belonging to another is absolutely null."5 Under one approach,
the courts utilized the theory under which certain contracts are deemed
to be burdened with a relative nullity. 6 This generally involved cases
in which title to the movable had passed from the original owner to
the intermediate seller, but such title was deemed to be relatively null.
Examples include cases in which there existed a vice of consent, such
as fraudulent impersonation,' 7 and cases involving dishonored checks."
The courts determined that, since title had passed, article 2452 did not
apply, because the movable did not belong to another. The action to
assert a relative nullity could only be brought by the original owner,
who could assert it only against his vendee. Therefore, the person who
acquired the movable from the original owner could validly pass title
to the third party bona fide purchaser, who was protected from the
claims of the original owner.
Under the second line of cases, the exception of equitable estoppel19
was applied in instances where title had not passed, but the owner had
turned over possession to another along with some other indicia of
ownership.20 This doctrine is based on the theory "that where one by
his words or conduct willfully causes another to believe the existence
of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief so
as to alter his own previous position, the former is precluded from
averring against the latter a different state of things as existing at the
same time. ' '2' The owner must have surrendered not only possession to
15. Comment, supra note 11, at 359.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 2031 provides in part: "A contract is relatively null when it
violates a rule intended for the protection of private parties, as when a party lacked
capacity or did not give free consent at the time the contract was made. A contract that
is only relatively null may be confirmed." The relative nullity exception is based on title
and is similar to the common law bona fide purchaser doctrine.
17. Freeport & Tampico Fuel Oil Corp. v. Lange, 157 La. 217, 102 So. 313 (1924);
Port Finance Co. v. Ber, 45 So. 2d 404 (La. App. Orl. 1950).
18. Jeffrey Motor Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So. 2d 369 (1956); Trumbull
Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Flatte v.
Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957).
19. S. Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 87, at 149:
The owner of a movable held by a purchaser in good faith who bought it from
one with neither title nor authority to sell may also be precluded from recovering
the thing by the operation of the principle of estoppel. This is so whenever the
owner by his words or conduct has expressly or impliedly represented that the
one in possession of the thing either is the owner or has authority to sell.
Under such circumstances the owner is estopped, or precluded from denying
the truth of his representation to a third party who, in good faith and reasonably
relying on the representation, purchased the thing.
20. Comment, supra note 11, at 359.
21. S. Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 87, at 150.
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the seller, but must have clothed him with some indicia of ownership
or authority to sell the thing, which induced the purchaser's reliance.2"
These cases typically involved a breach of confidence by an agent or
fiduciary. 3 The owners were held to have contributed to their own loss
by negligence in their dealings, and could not be heard to complain
against an innocent purchaser.
Thus, as of 1979, the general rule was that the sale of a thing
belonging to another was null, subject to certain jurisprudentially de-
veloped exceptions.
1979 Revision of Title II-Ownership and 1982 Revision of Title
XXIV-Prescription
Upon recommendation from the Law Institute, the legislature added
two new chapters to the Civil Code. Chapter 3, entitled Transfer of
Ownership by Agreement, contains articles 517-525, and Chapter 4,
entitled Protection of Ownership, includes articles 526-532.24 The drafters
noted that the rule that possession is equivalent to title with respect to
movables had been adopted by all modern civil codes and the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), 25 and was better suited to Louisiana's con-
temporary commercial economy.2 6 The Expose des Motifs to the chapter
on transfer of ownership explained that "Articles 518 through 525 ...
establish a significant change in the law in an effort to re-align Louisiana
law with modern civil law and the Uniform Commercial Code. ' 2 7
Article 518 establishes the general principle that the ownership of
a movable is voluntarily transferred by a contract between the owner
22. Id. at 150. Examples of indicia of ownership include not only possession of the
thing, but of documents such as title papers or an invoice, statements made in the presence
of others, or some other act creating the appearance of authority to sell. For a discussion
of the problems of application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, see generally S.
Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 92, at 157-61, and Comment, supra note 11, at 355-58.
23. Conner v. S. L. Hill & Co., 6 La. Ann. 7 (1851); James v. Judice, 140 So. 2d
169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 125 La. 1013, 52 So. 131
(1910). But see Holloway v. A. J. Ingersoll Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
24. La. Civ. Code arts. 517-532 (effective Jan. 1, 1980). These articles were part of
a wholesale amendment and reenactment of Title II of Book II of the Louisiana Civil
Code governing ownership, 1979 La. Acts No. 180. Article 525 states that the provisions
of Chapter 3 (articles 517-525) do not apply to movables required by law to be registered
in the public records (automobiles). This raises the question as to whether Chapter 4
(article 530 in particular) applies to such movables.
25. La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 477-532, Expose des Motifs 209, 213 (West 1980)
[hereinafter Expose des Motifs]. See French Civ. Code art. 2279; Greek Civ. Code art.
1036; Italian Civ. Code art. 1153; Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (B.G.B) § 932; Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-403.
26. Expose des Motifs, supra note 25, at 213.
27. Id. at 212.
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and the transferee. 2 s Article 52029 provided an important exception to
article 518. A transferor who was not the owner of the movable, yet
who had possession with the consent of the owner, could transfer the
ownership of the movable to a transferee in good faith and for fair
value. The comments to article 52030 made it clear that the good faith
transferee acquired ownership of the movable, regardless of the owner's
negligence or lack of negligence.3"
Article 521 was designed as a limitation on the scope of article 520
by providing that "one who has possession of a lost or stolen thing
may not transfer its ownership to another. 'a2 A thing is "stolen" for
purposes of article 521 only when one has taken possession of it without
the owner's consent. This article expressly excludes from the concept of
"stolen" a delivery or transfer of ownership of the thing by the owner
as a result of fraud. Thus, if a movable is transferred through a vice
of consent,3 it is not to be considered a stolen thing for purposes of
article 521. The transferee in that transaction may therefore transfer
ownership to a subsequent transferee.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 518. See also La. Civ. Code art. 518, comment (e) (West
1980) ("Article 518 reiterates the fundamental principle that a movable may be alienated
only by the owner or by persons authorized by him or by law."). "By law" refers to
the exception established in article 520.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 520 (suspended by La. Senate Concurrent Resolution No.
172, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980), repealed by 1981 La. Acts No. 125) provided: "A transferee
in good faith for fair value acquires the ownership of a corporeal movable, if the transferor,
though not owner, has possession with the consent of the owner, as pledgee, lessee,
depositary or other person of similar standing." Good faith is defined in article 523 as
follows: "An acquirer of a corporeal movable is in good faith for purposes of this Chapter
unless he knows, or should have known, that the transferor was not the owner."
30. La. Civ. Code art. 520, comment (c) (West 1980) states that "[u]nder Article
520, a good faith acquirer of a corporeal movable for value is protected even if the
owner is not charged with negligence in the pursuit of his affairs." This provision goes
beyond the doctrine of equitable estoppel in its protection of the good faith purchaser.
31. Note that negligence had been an important consideration in the prior juris-
prudence, as explained id. at comment (e): "Under the jurisprudence, one who acquires
the possession of a corporeal movable by fraud may not transfer ownership to a good
faith acquirer for value unless the owner is charged with some negligence." See also S.
Litvinoff, supra note 3, § 87, at 150 (A finding of negligence in the owner could be
found in an imprudent entrusting of the thing or carelessness in selecting an agent.).
32. La. Civ. Code art. 521 provides:
One who has possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfer its ownership
to another. For purposes of this Chapter, a thing is stolen when one has taken
possession of it without the consent of its owner. A thing is not stolen when
the owner delivers it or transfers its ownership to another as a result of fraud.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 522 provides: "A transferee of a corporeal movable in good
faith and for fair value retains the ownership of the thing even though the title of the
transferor is annulled on account of a vice of consent." This provision is a codification
of the jurisprudence involving relative nullities. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
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Article 524 modifies article 521. Although one who possesses a lost
or stolen thing cannot transfer its ownership, a possessor of a lost or
stolen thing who bought it "at a public auction or from a merchant
customarily selling similar things" is entitled to reimbursement of the
purchase price from the original owner who reclaims the thing.3 4
The articles in Chapter 4 on protection of ownership that are im-
portant to the matter under consideration are articles 526 and 530.
Article 526 provides for an innominate real action, entitling the owner
of a thing "to recover it from anyone who possesses or detains it
without right, and to obtain judgment recognizing his ownership and
ordering delivery of the thing to him." 5 According to Professor Yian-
nopoulos, reporter for the revision, article 526 authorizes the dispossessed
owner of a movable to bring a revendicatory action against a possessor
or detentor in order to have his ownership recognized and to recover
the movable. 6
Article 530 is fundamental to the burden of proof in the revendi-
catory action. It establishes a presumption of ownership based on pos-
session. The present possessor of the movable is presumed to be the
owner. The previous possessor is presumed to have been the owner
during the period of his possession. However, the presumption in favor
of the present possessor does not avail against the previous possessor
if the previous possessor can show that he was dispossessed of the thing
as a result of loss or theft. 7
34. La. Civ. Code art. 524 provides:
The owner of a lost or stolen movable may recover it from a possessor who
bought it in good faith at a public auction or from a merchant customarily
selling similar things on reimbursing the purchase price. The former owner of
a lost, stolen, or abandoned movable that has been sold by authority of law
may not recover it from the purchaser.
The effect of this article is that the original owner must buy back his movable at the
merchant's price. If he recovers the thing before the merchant sells it, the reimbursement
requirement does not apply.
35. Expose des Motifs, supra note 25, at 214. See also La. Civ. Code art. 526, which
provides: "The owner of a thing is entitled to recover it from anyone who possesses or
detains it without right and to obtain judgment recognizing his ownership and ordering
delivery of the thing to him."
36. A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 236, at 630, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d
ed. 1980).
37. La. Civ. Code art. 530 provides:
The possessor of a corporeal movable is presumed to be its owner. The previous
possessor of a corporeal movable is presumed to have been its owner during
the period of his possession.
These presumptions do not avail against a previous possessor who was dis-
possessed as a result of loss or theft.
The significance of this article with respect to the burden of proof in a revindicatory
action will be discussed infra.
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The articles on acquisitive prescription of movables were amended
in 1982, thereby effecting a further change in the law.3" Article 3490
allows one who possesses a movable as owner, in good faith, under an
act sufficient to transfer ownership, and without interruption for three
years, to acquire ownership by prescription, regardless of whether the
movable was lost or stolen.3 9 If the possessor lacks good faith or title,
he can acquire ownership by possession for ten years. 40 The true owner
can vindicate4' his ownership before the possessor acquires ownership
by prescription, subject to the reimbursement provision of article 524.42
In summary, several important changes in the law occurred as a
result of the revision. Article 520 created a broad exception to the
principle of article 2452. 43 Article 530 established a presumption in favor
of the present possessor." Article 3490 provided for three-year acquisitive
prescription, even against the owner of a lost or stolen movable. These
articles embody the shift in legislative policy from protection of the
security of ownership to protection of the security of transaction.
1981-Article 520 is Repealed
Article 520 was the keystone of the revision of the articles relating
to the transfer of movables. It marked the most significant change in
Louisiana law, by virtue of the broad exception it established to the
38. La. Civ. Code art. 3490, comment (a) (Supp. 1987).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 3490 provides: "One who has possessed a movable as owner,
in good faith, under an act sufficient to transfer ownership, and without interruption for
three years, acquires ownership by prescription." By contrast, La. Civ. Code art. 3506
(1870) excepted lost and stolen things from three-year acquisitive prescription. Article 3509
(1870) provided for ten-year acquisitive prescription for stolen things, and acquisition of
lost things was governed by article 3422 (1870). Lost things are now governed by article
3419 which states: "One who finds a corporeal movable that has been lost is bound to
make a diligent effort to locate its owner or possessor and to return the thing to him.
If a diligent effort is made and the owner is not found within three years, the finder
acquires ownership." See generally Note, Working With the New Civil Code Property
Scheme: The 1982 Book III Revision, 43 La. L. Rev. 1079, 1084-87 (1983).
40. La. Civ. Code art. 3491 provides: "One who has possessed a movable as owner
for ten years acquires ownership by prescription. Neither title nor good faith is required
for this prescription." This article reproduces article 3509 (1870).
41. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
42. La. Civ. Code art. 524. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. See generally
Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law of Possession and Acquisitive
Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev. 69, 127 n.88 (1983) (stating that "The Blackwell rule . ..
which provided that reimbursement of the purchase price was required only if the thing
was recovered after three years from purchase but not before, was legislatively overruled
in 1979 by UA 524").
43. La. Civ. Code art. 520, comment (a) (West 1980). See supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
44. La. Civ. Code art. 530. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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principle of article 2452 that no one can transfer a greater right than
he himself has.4" It allowed one who did not own a thing to transfer
ownership to another. 46 Although article 520 was effective as of January
1980, the legislature suspended its operation during the 1980 Regular
Session, 47 and repealed it in 1981 .48 The repeal was in response to the
confusion and apprehension generated by the article among Louisiana
retailers and equipment leasing companies. 49 Concerned with the ability
of lessees to transfer ownership of leased equipment to third parties,
representatives of these groups lobbied for the repeal of article 520. In
enacting that repeal, the legislature intended to eliminate potential abuse
by lessees and others who hold movables for owners; unfortunately,
what appeared to be a simple remedy could potentially produce unin-
tended consequences.
Effect of the Repeal of Article 520
Article 520 codified a rule similar to but broader than the juris-
prudential doctrine of equitable estoppel. Unlike equitable estoppel, which
is based on the express or implied representation by the owner that the
seller has the authority to sell the thing, article 520 was to be applied
regardless of the nature of the original owner's actions in relinquishing
possession of the thing. Its repeal may be seen as a rejection of the
entire estoppel exception, or more probably, a return to the case by
case approach to determining the effect of an owner's negligence on
the validity of the sale of his property by another.50 In addition, it is
reasonable to conclude that the repeal of article 520 indicates a legislative
intention that a person who acquired possession of a movable from a
transferor who had possession of such movable with the owner's consent
should not acquire ownership. However, the force of such a conclusion
is weakened by the failure of the legislature to repeal or amend the
other articles of the revision that supported article 520.
In testimony before the Senate Judiciary A Committee, Professor
Yiannopoulos characterized the repeal of article 520 as a "half-hearted"
repeal of the law." Professor Litvinoff, at that same hearing, testified
that "the repeal of article 520 would not extend those persons [retailers
45. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46. Article 520 was thus an example of the proverbial exception that (almost) swal-
lowed the rule.
47. La. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 172, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980).
48. 1981 La. Acts No. 125.
49. Senate Judiciary A Committee Meeting minutes of June 2, 1981 (considering HB
998 to repeal article 520).
50. Unfortunately, there have been no cases involving this particular question since
the revision, so the courts have not had a chance to interpret the intent of the legislature.
51. Senate Judiciary A Committee Meeting minutes, supra note 49.
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and lessors] as much protection as they feel it would." 52 He added that
the elimination of article 520 would only deprive Louisiana courts of
the guidance it provides.
The problem to which these statements refer is that article 520 was
originally passed not as an isolated provision, but as a part of an entire
scheme of law; it was meant to be read in, pari materia with the articles
enacted in conjunction with it. The repeal of that single article ignored
the rest of that scheme. Article 521 was enacted as an exception to 520.
The other articles in the revision and in other parts of the code modified
and qualified article 520. How does that scheme work without article
520?
Article 520 was intended mainly to handle the problem of breaches
of confidence in instances in which the owner entrusted the thing to a
person, as lessee, depositary, pledgee, or other agent, who subsequently
sold it to someone else. For example, suppose A buys a bicycle from
a dealer. A then loans his bicycle to B, who sells it to C. If C was in
good faith and paid fair value, article 520 would have placed ownership
of the bicycle in C. In the absence of article 520, there is no positive
authority to support the conclusion that C keeps the bicycle. The repeal
of article 520 implies a legislative intent to deny ownership by C.
However, article 521 remains in effect, and it states that one who has
possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfer ownership. The
negative implication of that proposition is that if the thing is not lost
or stolen, the possessor may transfer it. In this hypothetical, the bicycle
was not "stolen" for purposes of article 521, because B had possession
of it with A's consent. Thus, two negative implications emerge. One
suggests that C is the owner, and the other suggests he is not.
The repeal of article 520 suggests that A, the original owner of the
bicycle, would be able to recover it. In searching for positive authority
to support this result, one might turn to article 2452, which provides
that the sale of a thing belonging to another is null.53 One might also
turn to article 526, which states that "[tihe owner of a thing is entitled
to recover it from anyone who possesses or detains it without right." '5 4
Bycontrast, article 530, which states that "[tihe possessor of a corporeal
movable is presumed to be its owner,"" gives to C, the possessor, rights
to the bicycle by virtue of his possession. The continued presence of
52. Id.
53. Arguably, the enactment of article 520 was, in effect, a repeal of article 2452.
If so, the question would arise as to whether the repeal of article 520 would revive article
2452.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 526.
55. La. Civ. Code art. 530.
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article 530 is what led Professor Yiannopoulos to term the repeal of
article 520 "half-hearted. ' 5 6
Article 530's presumption in favor of the current possessor does not
avail against the previous possessor, if he can prove that he was dis-
possessed as a result of theft or loss.57 However, the facts of the
hypothetical indicate that since A turned over possession to B with
consent, the bicycle was not stolen. Or was it?
The Concept of Theft-Articles 521 and 530
The discussion in the previous section raises the question of whether
article 521 and article 530 are consistent in their conceptions of theft.
Article 521 contemplates theft as a taking of possession of a thing
without the consent of the owner.5" The comments point out that this
approach is in accord with the narrow definition applied in continental
legal systems, where theft is defined as a misappropriation or taking
without the consent of the owner. It does not include embezzlement or
situations where the owner delivers or transfers possession out of fraud
or artifice.59
The first paragraph of Article 530 establishes two presumptions:
first, that the present possessor is the owner; second, that the previous
possessor was the owner during his possession. The second paragraph
provides that the presumption in favor of the present possessor will not
avail against a previous possessor who "was dispossessed as a result of
loss or theft." 6
The application of article 521's definition of a "stolen" thing is
expressly limited, by the phrase "for purposes of this Chapter," to
articles 517 through 525, which pertain to transfer of ownership. 61 How-
ever, no legislative direction as to the definition or application of "theft"
is provided in article 530. Of course, at the time of the drafting of the
revision, it was unnecessary for the concept of theft in article 521 to
be explicitly applied to article 530, because unless the previous possessor
could prove that the movable was taken without his consent, title would
have passed under the operation of article 520. The question becomes
whether the legislature's purpose in repealing article 520 would best be
served by applying the narrow concept of theft contained in article 521
56. See text accompanying supra note 49.
57. La. Civ. Code art. 530.
58. La. Civ. Code art. 521 provides: "For purposes of this Chapter, a thing is stolen
when one has taken possession of it without the consent of its owner. A thing is not
stolen when the owner delivers it or transfers its ownership to another as a result of
fraud."
59. La. Civ. Code art. 521, comment (b) (West 1980).
60. La. Civ. Code art. 530.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 521.
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to cases involving article 530, or whether a broader definition would
lead to more just results.
The importance of deciding on a consistent concept of theft can be
illustrated with reference to the hypothetical described earlier. In order
for A, who loaned his bicycle to B, to recover it from C, who bought
it in good faith from B, A must overcome the presumption that C, the
present possessor, is the owner. Article 530 enables A to do this if he
can prove that he was the previous possessor and that he was dispossessed
through loss or theft.
If "theft" in article 530 is limited to the concept used in article
521, then A has not been dispossessed as a result of theft; the bicycle,
having been loaned to B, has not been "stolen." Therefore, the pre-
sumption that C is the owner will operate against A. A would then
have to shoulder the burden of proving his ownership by the ordinary
means .62
On the other hand, if "theft" in article 530 is interpreted more
broadly, so that it includes B's breach of A's confidence, A would then
be able to overcome the presumption in favor of the current possessor
C. A could rely on the presumption of previous possession to prove
his ownership. The more difficult burden of proof would then be shifted
to the current possessor.
The comments to article 521 reveal an intention that the narrow
definition of theft be applied beyond Chapter Three. Comment (b) states
that, in continental legal systems, theft is narrowly defined to mean a
taking without the consent of the owner:
For civil law purposes, and particularly for the purpose of Article
521, the definition of theft is much more limited than the
criminal law definition .... The broad definition of theft for
the purposes of criminal prosecution does not alter the provisions
of the Civil Code of Louisiana and other statutes relating to
sales and transfer of title. 63
Clearly, this comment contemplates that theft receive a narrow inter-
pretation for all civil law purposes, and not just for purposes of Chapter
Three. In addition, since the broadly stated purpose of the revision was
to bring Louisiana law in line with other civil law systems and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 64 which also give theft this narrow meaning,
there is support for the view that theft as used in article 530 was
intended to have the narrow meaning provided for in article 521.
62. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 36, § 239, at 635 (Ordinarily, plaintiff would have
to prove that he acquired the movable by transfer from a previous owner, accession, or
acquisitive prescription.).
63. la. Civ. Code art. 521, comment (b) (West 1980) (emphasis added).
64. U.C.C. § 2-403 (1977).
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Nevertheless, by its express terms article 521 prohibits reliance on
its definition of theft in situations not involving application of those
articles contained in Chapter Three. Furthermore, the policy behind the
repeal of article 520, that is, to promote the security of ownership,
certainly would be advanced by the application of a broad definition
of theft in article 530, rather than by resort to the narrow definition
of article 521.
Article 530-Possession, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof
In order to appreciate how article 530 operates, it is necessary to
examine it in relation to the general articles on possession found in
Chapter 2 of Title XXIII. 65 Article 3421 defines possession as "the
detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing, movable or immovable,
that one holds or exercises by himself or by another who keeps it in
his name." 66 Article 3422 distinguishes possession, as a matter of fact,
from the right to possess, which is acquired after one year of factual
possession. 67 The comments to article 3422 state that physical, factual
possession alone does not give rise to possessory protection, but that
possessory protection is predicated on acquisition of the right to possess. 68
Article 3423 provides that a possessor is treated as the owner of the
thing until the right of the true owner is established. 69
Although the principles stated in articles 3422 and 3423 are applicable
to both movables and immovables, 70 there is no nominate action provided
by the Code of Civil Procedure to protect possession of movables.
Nonetheless, one seeking recovery of a movable can bring a revendicatory
action authorized by article 526.71 How does article 530 fit into this
system of protecting possession?
The presumptions of article 530 provide a means of proving own-
ership in a revindicatory action. Such presumptions' are necessary in the
absence of a system of public recordation of title to movables. The
first sentence of paragraph 1 of article 530 presumes that the current
possessor is the owner. When a previous possessor (the plaintiff) brings
a revendicatory action seeking recovery of a movable from the current
65. La. Civ. Code arts. 3421-3444 (effective Jan. 1, 1983).
66. La. Civ. Code art. 3421. See also article 3424 which provides: "To acquire
possession, one must intend to possess as owner and must take corporeal possession of
the thing."
67. La. Civ. Code art. 3422 provides: "Possession is a matter of fact; nevertheless,
one who has possessed a thing for over a year acquires the right to possess it."
68. La. Civ. Code art. 3422, comment (b) (Supp. 1987).
69. La. Civ. Code art. 3423 provides: "A possessor is considered provisionally as
owner of the thing he possesses until the right of the true owner is established."
70. See comment (c) to La. Civ. Code art. 3423 (Supp. 1987).
71. La. Civ. Code art. 526; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 36, § 236, at 630.
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possessor (the defendant), the plaintiff has the burden of proving his
ownership. 72 Ordinarily the plaintiff must satisfy this burden by showing
that he acquired the movable by a transfer from a previous owner, by
accession, or by acquisitive prescription." However, in situations where
the plaintiff can show he was deprived of lawful possession through
loss or theft, the presumption in favor of the present possessor does
not avail against him, and he may prove his ownership through the
presumption that the previous possessor was owner. The burden of proof
of ownership is then shifted to the defendant.
Article 530 stops short of providing exactly what the defendant must
prove in order to rebut the presumption that the previous possessor is
the owner, and commentators disagree. Professor Hargrave argues that
the current possessor must prove his ownership. He suggests several
ways to do this, such as occupancy, acquisitive prescription, rules of
apparent agency and estoppel, and several special statutes, as well as
derivative title from another who had acquired ownership by such means.
74
He raises the question of whether the current possessor should be able
to rebut the presumption that the previous possessor is owner by showing
that the previous possessor cannot establish title either. He concludes
that, practically, any effort to rebut the presumption by such means
would be futile, and that the current possessor can only prevail against
the previous possessor by proving his own title."
Professor Yiannopoulos takes the position that "the defendant, in
order to be allowed to retain the movable, must prove that the plaintiff
was never its owner, or, if he was, he lost his ownership. ' ' 76 Additionally,
he asserts that "[tihe revendicatory action will fail if the defendant has
acquired the ownership of the movable by acquisitive prescription, by
accession, [or] by transfer from the true owner. ' 7 7 He recognizes the
possibility that the current possessor may be able to show that the
previous possessor never did own the thing, i.e., that he had found it
and had not yet acquired by occupancy, or that he had acquired it
from a thief and had not yet acquired it by prescription. Such a showing,
according to Professor Yiannopoulos, would allow the defendant to
retain the movable.
There is nothing in article 530 to preclude the current possessor
from rebutting the presumption in favor of the previous possessor in
this way. In fact, it is the same means the previous possessor used to
72. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 36, § 239, at 635.
73. Id.
74. Hargrave, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Louisiana Property Law, 46
La. L. Rev. 225, 231-32 (1985).
75. Id.
76. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 36, § 239, at 636.
77. Id. § 240, at 637.
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rebut the presumption in favor of the current possessor, by showing
that he could not be the owner. Does such a showing in effect revive
the presumption that the current possessor is the owner? A logical
conclusion is that the rebuttal of both presumptions, by showing that
neither party in fact has acquired ownership, would leave article 530
ineffective to prove ownership.
An example may help to clarify the foregoing. Suppose that A buys
a bicycle from X, who has stolen it from a bicycle store. A believed
in good faith that X owned the bicycle, but he has no way to prove
it because X is now gone. A has possessed the bicycle for two and
one-half years. Then B steals the bicycle from A and sells it to C, who
buys it in good faith. Under article 530, C is presumed to be the owner.
If A rebuts that presumption by showing that the bicycle was stolen
from him, A is now presumed to be the owner. Can C rebut this
presumption by showing that A never owned the bicycle because he
bought it from a thief and has not yet acquired it by prescription? If
so, both of the presumptions of article 530 would be rebutted, neither
party would be presumed to be the owner, and it would become necessary
to resort to a "better title ' 78 approach to resolve the dispute.
Professor Hargrave argues that:
[S]uch an approach is difficult without a title registration system
such as that employed for immovables. Because it is difficult
to prove title to movables, possession becomes more important,
and necessary, as a means of settling such disputes. It is, in
effect, the better title. For that reason, the presumption here
[in article 530] should work to let the previous possessor prevail
unless the later possessor rebuts it by coming forward and
proving ownership. 7
9
78. Hargrave, supra note 76, at 232. Cf. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3653, which provides:
To obtain a judgment recognizing his ownership of immovable property or real
right therein, the plaintiff in a petitory action shall:
(1) Prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by
acquisitive prescription, if the court finds that the defendant is in possession
thereof; or
(2) Prove a better title thereto than the defendant, if the court finds that
the latter is not in possession thereof.
The notion of "better title" is very difficult conceptually. It arises when both
parties in a petitory action are out of possession, but claim the property through
an act translative of title. Title is not to be considered equivalent to ownership.
"Better title" contemplates that, although neither party can prove record own-
ership, one has a better claim than the other. For a discussion of the notion
of better title and the problems of this approach, see Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner,
294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974); Kelso v. Lange, 421 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982); Deselle v. Bonnette, 251 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
79. Hargrave, supra note 76, at 232-33.
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This is a reasonable solution but not an altogether satisfactory one.
With both possessors claiming title through a thief, they are really in
the same position, and if the previous possessor can rebut the pre-
sumption of the current possessor's ownership by showing that he never
did own it, the current possessor should be able to rebut the previous
possessor's presumption of ownership in the same way. The inequity of
not allowing this is demonstrated by the following modification to the
hypothetical. Suppose that A acquired the bicycle from a thief and
possessed it for one week, when it was stolen from him and sold to
C, who has possessed the bicycle for over two years. Now, after all
that time, A seeks to recover the bicycle from C. If C must prove
ownership, he will lose and A will get the bicycle.
If two people claim the ownership of a movable, neither of whom
can prove it is his, who should get to keep it, the one who has it now
or the one who had it first? The presumptions of article 530 provide
a workable solution in most instances, because it will be a rare case
when the current possessor will be able to show how the previous
possessor acquired it or that he was never owner. In the exceptional
case, however, article 530 does not deal with the basic rights of pos-
sessors. One solution may be derived from Professor Hargrave's state-
ment that "possession becomes more important, and necessary, as a
means of settling such disputes." 80 If neither party can prove his own-
ership by means of the presumptions in article 530, the articles on
possession can provide the solution.
The Code recognizes that the possession of movables ought to be
protected. Article 3444 provides that "[p]ossession of movables is pro-
tected by the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure that govern civil
actions."'" The comments state that "there is no nominate action for
the protection of the possession of movables. A possessor of movables
who has been disturbed in his possession, however, may bring a civil
action for recovery of possession." '8 2 Article 3422 states that possession
is a matter of fact, but that one who possesses a thing for over a year
acquires the right to possess it. The comments add that "[p]ossessory
protection is predicated on acquisition of the right to possess. This right
to possess is acquired by one who has been for a year in peaceable
and uninterrupted possession .... ."I" There is nothing in the Code
which says that the right to possess only applies to immovables.
In the possessory action 4 for immovables, the plaintiff who seeks
to have his possession restored must prove that he has acquired the
80. Id.
81. La. Civ. Code art. 3444.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 3444, comment (b) (Supp. 1987).
83. La. Civ. Code art. 3422, comment (b) (Supp. 1987).
84. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3655, 3658.
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right to possess in order to maintain the action. This procedural rule
is merely an expression of the substantive rules of possession in the
Civil Code. The absence of procedural implementation in regard to
movables should not preclude application of the same substantive rules.
The possession articles, in order to provide some security to pos-
session, favor the person who possessed the thing for at least one year.
These articles would provide a more equitable means to settle disputes
in which the current possessor can show that the previous possessor was
never the lawful owner, even though the current possessor cannot prove
title in himself either. In such instances, the party who has acquired
the right to possess under article 3422 should prevail. Thus, if the
present possessor has possessed the thing for a year, he should be allowed
to retain possession. If the previous possessor had the thing for a year,
he should be allowed to recover possession. If neither party has possessed
for a year, the thing should remain with the current possessor, because
the previous possessor has an insufficient interest in the thing to warrant
interference with the current possession.
Conclusion
In the absence of post-revision jurisprudence for guidance, one must
look to the interests sought to be protected by the legislature in the
revision. In 1979 the legislature made a significant policy shift which
sought to protect the security of transaction at the expense of the security
of ownership. By repealing article 520 in 1981, the legislature took a
large step backward from that shift in policy, reflecting a concern for
the security of ownership.
Consistent with this concern, article 521 should be amended to
provide for a broad concept of theft that includes delivery to another
as a result of fraud and breach of confidence. 5 An exception could be
made in the case where the original owner is charged with negligence
in the pursuit of his affairs, assuming the continued validity of the
jurisprudence on equitable estoppel. Consistency would also dictate that
the same concept of theft be applied to article 530, to allow a non-
85. A transfer of ownership as a result of fraud, where the owner intends
to transfer title, is to be distinguished from delivery as a result of fraud. A
transfer of ownership as a result of fraud, which is a vice of consent, results
in a transfer of a relatively null title to the defrauder, who can transfer good
title to a transferee in good faith under article 522. If the owner merely delivers
the thing to the defrauder (for example, if he delivers it to one misrepresenting
himself as a depositary), and he has no intention of transferring title, article
522 does not apply. Breach of confidence is distinguished in that the person to
whom the thing is delivered is really a depositary (no misrepresentation), but
he sells the thing in violation of the deposit agreement.
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negligent original owner dispossessed by fraud to rebut the presumption
that the current possessor is owner.
Article 530 should be interpreted as a method of proving ownership
over and above possession. Where both presumptions can be rebutted
by proof that neither party is the actual owner, however, principles of
possession should apply. Such an interpretation protects the person who
has possessed a thing for a long period of time, short of acquisitive
prescription, regardless of whether he is the current or the previous
possessor. This solution strikes a balance between the security of own-
ership and the security of transaction, and thus would be consistent
with the policy currently in operation in Louisiana law.
Tanya Ann Ibieta
